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On the eve of the lecture by the authors of The Spirit Level 
at the University of Auckland in May 2014, Tim Hazledine 
pointed to a 2006 international survey which found that  
New Zealanders were less supportive of redistributing 
income from the rich to the poor than people in most other 
nations in the survey. ‘I don’t think that leads to saying all 
is well’, Hazledine said. ‘I think inequality is a problem. 
But we have to understand why we tolerate it’; ‘We have to 
understand why we don’t have blood flowing in the streets’ 
(Collins, 2014).
already historically high levels (Piketty, 
2014). In The Price of Inequality: how 
today’s divided society endangers our future, 
Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz asks us to 
recognise that the new settler countries 
like the United States and New Zealand are 
no longer lands of opportunity for all, and 
how their inequality, especially at the top, 
is due to rent-seeking and therefore bad for 
growth (Stiglitz, 2013). Princeton’s Angus 
Deaton in an historical treatment links 
rising inequalities to growing differences in 
our health and well-being (Deaton, 2013). 
These treatments echo and support many 
of the concerns about New Zealand voiced 
by Max Rashbrooke in last year’s March 
issue of Policy Quarterly (Rashbrooke, 
2014) and by those who contributed to 
his edited volume on inequality in New 
Zealand (Rashbrooke, 2013).
These concerns over inequalities are 
particularly important for New Zealand 
because we have become one of the more 
unequal societies in the OECD at the level 
of both the individual and the household 
(OECD, 2014b; Perry, 2014; Collins, 
2014). However, such an international 
positioning is based only on objective 
measures of income. By contrast, we are 
far less aware of what people actually think 
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About Income 
Inequality?
Concern about the values that underlie our 
current levels of income inequality mirror 
a growing international unease over the 
social implications of rising inequality.1 
Since The Spirit Level (Wilkinson and 
Pickett, 2009), several texts have offered 
further reasons for concern. One of these 
reasons is the tendency for inequality 
to increase. In Capital in the Twenty-
first Century, Thomas Piketty observes 
how modern economic growth and the 
diffusion of knowledge have failed to 
reduce inequality, and carry a dynamic 
which may take inequality beyond its 
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subjectively about inequality – the level 
of inequality they regard as acceptable 
and what they think government’s role 
should be in redistributing income. It is 
these subjective views that are of interest 
in this article. Ironically, the views people 
themselves hold about inequality may be 
reason for an even deeper concern over 
the future of inequality in New Zealand.
Of central concern is the way in which 
current levels of both income inequality 
and redistribution in New Zealand are 
being sustained by the prevailing value 
distribution. Contrary to the thesis that 
inequality is imposed from above or 
from outside the country, and, implicitly, 
that growing inequality runs counter to 
most people’s wishes, the survey evidence 
presented below suggests that current 
levels of inequality are actually supported 
by the current balance of people’s 
attitudes to inequality and their views on 
their government’s role in redistribution. 
Our attitudes towards income inequality and 
(re)distribution
Surveys administered to New Zealanders 
by the World Values Survey (WVS) in 1998, 
2004 and 2011 and by the International 
Social Science Programme (ISSP) in 1996 
and 2006 have opened a window on our 
attitudes to income inequality and what 
we want government to do about it. 
Surprisingly, few of these survey findings 
have received more than passing mention 
either in the New Zealand media or in 
academia. 
Figure 1 shows the years in which 
these five surveys were administered. 
They are deliberately placed against the 
changing rate of unemployment over 
the last decade and a half. The first two 
surveys were administered in 1996 and 
1998 when unemployment rates were 
relatively high at between 6 and 7%. The 
next two were fielded in 2004 and 2006 
when the economy was growing rapidly 
and unemployment had fallen to between 
3.5 and 5%. The fifth survey, in 2011, was 
undertaken when unemployment rates 
had again risen to between 6 and 7%.
Over the decade and a half covered 
by this sequence of surveys the level 
of income inequality in New Zealand 
remained relatively stable: the Gini index 
ranged between 0.30 and 0.33 (Perry, 
2014)2 and the ratio of the top 20% to 
the bottom 20% (P80/P20 ratio) hovered 
between 2.42 and 2.74 (and between 
2.54 and 3.12 after adjusting for housing 
costs).3 This last point is important for 
our interpretation of the survey evidence 
because there is empirical evidence that 
higher observed inequality will induce 
a greater preference for redistribution, 
as argued by one of the most influential 
political economy models (Meltzer 
and Richard, 1981). At the same time, 
while rising inequality does have direct 
and indirect effects on redistributive 
preferences, it is not just the level of 
inequality but also the structure of the 
inequality that matters (Toth, Horn 
and Medgyesi, 2014).4 An increase in 
inequality will ‘only partly convert into 
demand for redistribution as part of 
the inequality increase appears in the 
expectations and, therefore, in tolerance 
for (somewhat) larger levels of inequality’ 
(ibid, p.2). 
An implicit assumption made by those 
who connect attitudes and inequality is 
that respondents are aware of the actual 
level of inequality. This is highly unlikely, 
and therefore the variation in subjective 
preferences present in opinion surveys like 
WVS and ISSP are likely to reflect both 
people’s preferences and their awareness 
of the actual levels of income inequality. 
Without appropriate experimentation, 
it is not possible to attribute the relative 
importance of each.5 
The following discussion begins with 
survey evidence on how New Zealanders 
view income inequality and the degree 
to which they support government’s 
redistribution of income. In section two 
these levels of support for government 
redistribution are compared to those held 
by residents of other countries. The final 
section foreshadows a future exploration 
of the way our views on income 
distribution vary across the population 
demographically and socio-economically, 
including their wealth and current and 
expected income. 
How we view income inequality
The World Values Survey is undertaken 
by a global network of social scientists 
studying changing values and their impact 
on social and political life. The WVS is 
headquartered in Sweden and since 1981 
has applied a common questionnaire 
to nationally representative samples in 
almost 100 countries, or almost 90% of the 
world’s population.6 The WVS question of 
interest here asks respondents to consider 
Figure 1: The timing of surveys assessing attitudes to income inequality in relation 
to the New Zealand unemployment rate 1990–2014 
Source: Household Labour Force Survey, ISSP and WVS surveys.
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Note 1: ISSP = International Social Science Programme ; WVS = World Values Survey 
Note 2: Survey field work dates WVS NZ: 2011 (17/11/2011 to 02/02/2012); 2004 (08/11/2004 to 
10/02/2005); 1998 (24/11/1998 to 01/12/1998). ISSP NZ: 1996 (24/04/1997 to 05/08/1997); 
2006 (09/08/2005 to 30/09/2005). Note that actual field work dates can vary slightly from the date 
given in the survey.
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whether ‘Incomes should be made more 
equal’, a response of 1 denoting complete 
agreement. At the other end of the scale 
is the statement, ‘We need large income 
differences as incentives for individual 
effort’, with a 10 indicating complete 
agreement. The distribution of responses 
to the 1998, 2004 and 2011 surveys (waves 
3, 5 and 6 respectively) is shown in Figure 
2.7 
Two important features of New 
Zealand attitudes emerge from the 
histograms in Figure 2. The first is 
the remarkable lack of consensus on 
whether incomes should be more equal 
or less equal. Not only is the sample 
population fairly evenly split across the 
upper and lower halves of the 10-point 
scale, but there is little concentration of 
views. If anything, there is a polarisation, 
evidenced by the heaping of extreme 
views at both ends of the scale. As we will 
see below, this heterogeneity of opinion 
on inequality sets New Zealand apart 
from many other countries. 
The second salient feature of Figure 2 
is the shift in the distribution over time. In 
the first period, which was characterised 
by high unemployment, a slightly higher 
percentage favoured greater income 
equality: 47.2%>46.5% (assuming those 
not answering or who answered ‘don’t 
know’ are drawn randomly from the 
population).8 The second survey, in 2004, 
took place when the unemployment 
rate had dropped by half, which was 
accompanied by a rightward shift in 
redistribution preferences: 45.9%<48.9%, 
a feature consistent with the positive 
empirical relationship between 
unemployment and income inequality 
itself.9 The boom did not last, and by 
2011 unemployment had climbed again 
to between 6 and 7%. Consistently, the 
distribution of preferences shifted back to 
the left, towards greater income equality: 
50.9%>42.3%.
At the same time, we might want to 
question just how much these temporal 
shifts in preferences were due to the 
unusually high proportion of respondents 
taking one of the extreme positions, 1 or 
10. In case the selection of the extremes 
is governed by a separate process, the 
mean score of the responses between the 
polar categories was calculated for each 
survey year, but they too follow a similar 
temporal pattern, rising from 5.69 to 
5.70, then down again to 5.48.10 
In summary, the responses to the 
World Values Survey question on income 
inequality in New Zealand expose a 
remarkable lack of consensus on how 
income should be distributed. At the 
same time, successive administration of 
the question over three periods of varying 
growth indicates a sensitivity to changes 
in the macroeconomy – in the availability 
of jobs and hence income opportunities 
over the period – supporting the view that 
an increase in economic growth lessens 
pressure for government redistribution 
of income.11 
The WVS was not the only instrument 
used to gather attitudes towards income 
distribution in New Zealand over this 
period. Support for the same broad 
conclusions comes from the two ISSP 
surveys fielded over a similar time interval. 
In questions which complement those 
above, the ISSP focused on the role New 
Zealander’s believed their government 
should play in redistributing income.
Should government redistribute income? 
The International Social Survey 
Programme is an ongoing programme 
of cross-national collaboration which 
administers surveys under the auspices of 
the Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences 
(GESIS). The programme brings together 
pre-existing social science projects and 
coordinates research goals, thereby adding 
a cross-national, cross-cultural perspective 
to the individual national studies. 
The ISSP’s 1996 question asked: 
‘What is your opinion of the following 
statement: “It is the responsibility of the 
government to reduce the differences 
in income between people with high 
incomes and those with low incomes”.’ 
Respondents were asked whether they 
Figure 2: The distribution of responses to the World Values Survey question: ‘Should incomes be made more equal or less equal?’ 
New Zealand 1998 (n =1201), 2004 (n = 954) and 2011 (n=841)
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Source: WVS. The ‘longitudinal’ series for all countries along with a mapping feature is available for online analysis at www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp.
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(1) Agree strongly; (2) Agree; (3) Neither 
agree nor disagree; (4) Disagree; (5) 
Disagree strongly. Ten years later, in 
2006, the same question was asked again 
but the response options were reduced 
from a five- to a four-point Likert scale, 
as follows: (1) Definitely should be; 
(2) Probably should be; (3) Probably 
should not be; (4) Definitely should 
not be. A comparison of the responses 
to the 1996 and 2006 ISSP surveys in 
Figure 3 suggests a reduction in support 
for redistribution over the intervening 
decade, a result which is consistent with 
the apparent decrease in preference for 
greater equality observed over the first 
two WVS surveys. In 1996 only 43.37% 
disagreed or strongly disagreed that it 
is government’s responsibility to reduce 
income differences between the rich and 
the poor in New Zealand. By 2006 this had 
risen to just over half, to 50.21%. The fact 
that both surveys were administered first 
in high and then in low unemployment 
periods likely accounts for at least some 
of the shift in attitudes towards income 
inequality.12
As it turns out, these ISSP results 
for New Zealand are relatively unusual 
internationally, and this raises questions 
about the particular socio-economic 
conditions and political and historical 
context conditioning New Zealander’s 
attitudes towards their government’s role 
in redistribution. 
International comparisons
A comparison of the New Zealand 
responses with those from 19 other 
countries answering the same survey in 
1996 and 2006 is instructive. Figure 4 
shows how the proportion selecting each 
response category of the government 
redistribution question was distributed 
across the 19 countries. (The countries are 
listed in note 1 to Figure 4.)13 
The first of the five box plots in 
Figure 4 captures the proportion in each 
of the 19 countries who ‘strongly agreed’ 
that it is the responsibility of government 
to reduce income differences. The ‘NZ’ 
marker indicates the position of the New 
Zealand proportion on the left scale. 
The highest percentages were Slovenia at 
51.73%, Russia at 43.28% and France at 
42.9%. New Zealand sits third-to-last at 
only 15.10%, behind Australia at 17.29% 
and Canada at 17.69%, but above the US 
at 12.1% and Philippines at 9.2%. In other 
words, in the mid-1990s New Zealand 
was one of the countries least likely to 
strongly support income redistribution, 
and this is in spite of considerable 
publicity given to the increasing income 
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Figure 3. ‘Is it government’s responsibility to reduce income differences between 
the rich and poor?’ ISSP New Zealand, 1996 (n=1139) and 2006 (n=1165)
Note 1: The following table aggregates the percentages over the first and last response categories:
Year
1–2 (agree strongly 
or agree) 3
4/5 (disagree or 
disagree strongly) Total 
1996 38.02 18.61 43.37 100%
2006 49.79 X 50.21 100%
Note 2: Details of the sample design and response rates of the ISSP survey may be found at http://www.issp.org/.
Source: ISSP
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Figure 4. ‘It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income 
between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.’ The 
distribution per country by response category as surveyed by ISSP in 1996
Note 1: The 19 countries present in both the 1996 and 2006 ISSP samples are: Australia, Canada, Czech 
Republic, France, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Poland, 
Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Great Britain and the US.
Note 2: As is conventional in box plots, the shaded box covers the inter-quartile range (IQR), with observations 
divided in half by the horizontal median line (Tukey, 1977). The ‘whiskers’  extend to the lower and 
upper adjacent values which are <=1.5 x IQR. The dots are outliers, those beyond 1.5 x IQR 
(inter-quartile range) (Cox, 2009).
Source: ISSP 1996. The figures from which these box plots have been drawn are available on request.
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inequality in New Zealand at that time. 
In this case, New Zealanders’ relatively 
weak support for redistribution is 
consistent with conclusions drawn from 
an earlier inspection of this same survey 
(Humpage, 2011).
An inspection of the remaining four 
box plots in Figure 4 shows that when 
people are asked about the prospect of 
their governments redistributing incomes 
(the right end of the figure), countries 
differ much more from each other than 
when they are asked about maintaining 
the status quo (the middle ‘agree’ plus 
‘neither’ categories). In this case New 
Zealand sat the middle of the distribution. 
However, a certain proportion of 
respondents in each country disagreed 
with the proposition that the government 
had a responsibility to redistribute, and 
New Zealand had one of the highest 
such proportions. Those who ‘strongly 
disagree’ with further redistribution made 
up 14.14% in New Zealand, well ahead of 
Australia at 11.24%, but fourth behind 
Canada at 19.37%, the US at 18.99% and 
Japan at 17.86%. 
One way of appreciating the 
unusual distribution of New Zealanders’ 
preferences for income (re)distribution is 
to compute the entropy of the distributions 
shown in Figure 3 for each country. 
Entropy in this context is a measure 
of uncertainty as to which response 
category a randomly selected person 
might choose.14 New Zealand exhibits a 
very high entropy in 1996, meaning there 
is a fairly even chance that any one of the 
five degrees of support for redistribution 
will be selected. By contrast, in a number 
of countries, such as Slovenia, Spain, 
Poland and Russia, the largest proportion 
of the population strongly agree that ‘It 
is the responsibility of the government to 
reduce the differences in income between 
people with high incomes and those with 
low incomes.’ New Zealanders, however, 
are relatively unconstrained in expressing 
their personal views, and the resulting 
diversity is reflected in the high entropy 
or evenness of our distribution. 
A similar situation prevailed ten 
years later when New Zealand occupied 
second position to the US in entropy 
terms, exhibiting 99.2% of the maximum 
possible level of uncertainty over the 
four response categories in 2006. Again, 
in contrast, choices made by residents 
in the eastern European countries of 
Hungary, Russia, Poland and Slovenia 
were considerably more certain (Russia’s 
entropy as a percentage of the possible 
maximum was only 69%, for example). 
Figure 5 is not an exactly comparable 
graph to Figure 4 because of the reduction 
in the number of response categories 
and the slight difference in the response 
options. What is relevant, however, is 
New Zealand’s relative position in each 
of the distributions, and this is largely 
unaffected by the aggregation of categories 
between the two surveys. In 2006 New 
Zealand sat at the bottom of the same 19 
countries when it came to agreeing that 
it ‘Definitely should be the government’s 
responsibility to reduce the differences 
in income between people with high 
incomes and those with low incomes.’ 
The New Zealand percentage of 22.15% 
was almost half the all-country average 
of 43%. Only the Czech Republic had a 
lower percentage supporting government 
redistribution than New Zealand.
In summary, the two ISSP surveys that 
asked the same question in the same set of 
19 countries in 1996 and 2006 show that 
when it comes to their government’s role 
in income redistribution, New Zealanders 
occupied a relatively unusual position 
internationally. In both survey years New 
Zealand respondents were among the most 
likely to hold the view that it was definitely 
not their government’s responsibility to 
reduce income differences, the 20.7% in 
2006 being exceeded only by the US at 
21.1%. It was this international survey 
that was referred to in the opening 
paragraph of this article, and the fact 
that we are now much less likely than 
most other countries to support income 
redistribution is a feature that surprises 
many older New Zealanders nurtured in 
the welfare state.15 
Conclusions
So, who does care about income 
inequality, and what do New Zealanders 
believe government’s role should be in 
redistributing income? An indifferent 
population would be clustered around 
the mid-points of the inequality and 
redistribution scales used in the above 
surveys. To the extent that New Zealand’s 
relatively uniform, high-entropy 
distribution is a marked departure from 
such a pattern, New Zealander’s do care 
about income distribution and the role 
their government should play. However, 
what they care about differs markedly. The 
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Figure 5: ‘It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income 
between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.’ The distribu-
tion by response category across the common 19 countries surveyed by the 
ISSP in 1996 and 2006
Source: ISSP 2006.
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survey results presented above indicate a 
fine balance between those who would like 
to see less and those who would like to see 
even greater income inequality. A similar 
wide dispersion of views is apparent 
when New Zealanders are asked about 
the government’s role in redistributing 
income. What on the surface is surprising 
about these results is that, despite 
growing evidence of the negative effects 
of inequality on society as a whole, fewer 
than half of us believe incomes should 
be made more equal or that government 
has a responsibility to do more to reduce 
income differences between people with 
high and low incomes. And this takes us 
back to the beginning, and why we do not, 
in Tim Hazeldine’s words, have ‘blood 
flowing in the streets’. 
Another, longer paper would be 
required to begin to explain why New 
Zealanders hold the attitudes they do. An 
analysis of unit records from successive 
New Zealand electoral surveys (Humpage, 
2014) suggests that people support 
redistribution when it appears to be to 
their personal advantage and resist it 
when they are less likely to benefit, a result 
which is consistent with the international 
evidence (Guillaud, 2013). The cyclical 
differences in levels of support for (in)
equality and redistribution shown above 
are consistent with such a view and the 
suggestion that redistribution preferences 
are sensitive to expected as well as current 
income. 
While belief in social mobility and 
the associated wish of individuals not 
to constrain their own future income 
by advocating greater redistribution 
applies in many countries, the evidence 
presented above does not explain why 
New Zealanders are relatively much more 
conservative, nor why we exhibit a wider 
spectrum of preferences for inequality 
and redistribution than a selection of 
other countries. Answering that question 
would require a comparative analysis 
of the peculiarities of New Zealand 
culture and institutions as they currently 
influence attitudes to inequality.16 
In December 2014 the OECD 
published empirical evidence of the 
negative effect income inequality has 
on economic growth (OECD, 2014a). 
The support historically high levels of 
inequality continued to receive from the 
majority of individuals in New Zealand 
through the first decade of the 2000s 
may, therefore, be a classic case of what 
Thomas Schelling earlier referred to 
as the tyranny of micro motives – the 
propensity of quite rational individuals 
to collectively generate irrational social 
outcomes (Schelling, 1978). It is no 
accident that Schelling’s primary example 
of such irrationality is residential 
segregation, which I will discuss in a 
companion article in a later issue of 
Policy Quarterly. 
1 By 2010 the New Zealand Gini coefficient of 0.32 was 16th 
in the ranking of the 34 OECD countries; the most unequal 
was Chile (0.50) and the least unequal was Iceland (0.24). 
For a review of ongoing OECD research on income inequality 
see http://www.oed.org/social/inequality.htm.
2 The Gini coefficient compares cumulative proportions of 
the population against cumulative proportions of income 
they receive. It ranges between 0 in the case of perfect 
equality and 1 in the case of perfect inequality (Statistics 
New Zealand: http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/
snapshots-of-nz/nz-social-indicators/Home/Standard%20
of%20living/income-inequality.aspx).
3 The P80/P20 ratio summarises the relative distance in the 
income distribution between high household incomes (those 
in the 80th percentile) and low household incomes (those 
in the 20th percentile). The higher the ratio, the greater the 
level of inequality (ibid).
4 The Gini coefficient as such does not indicate the structure of 
inequality and quite different patterns of income distribution 
can give rise to the same single coefficient. 
5 There is evidence that people surveyed do not appreciate 
the full extent of income inequality, although the degree 
can vary internationally (Osberg and Smeeding, 2006). At 
the same time, there is also a positive correlation between 
inequality levels based on ‘ought to earn’ incomes and the 
Gini index (Andersen and Yaish, 2012). In the case of New 
Zealand, Peter Skilling (AUT) surveyed over 1000 people 
using the online Buzz Channelmarket research service and 
found that most people thought the top 20% wealthiest New 
Zealanders owned just over half the wealth (51.8%), that 
the next 20% owned 18.3% of the wealth, and the bottom 
three 20% slices of the population by wealth owned 14.6%, 
9% and the poorest quintile 6.3%. As Skilling points out, 
the official figures are quite different and they indicate that 
the richest 20% owned 70% of the wealth, with 18% in the 
hands of the second-richest quintile and 10% in the hands 
of the middle quintile. Just 2% was owned by people in the 
fourth quintile, while the bottom owned nothing. 
6 The New Zealand sampling frame was an electronic version 
of the electoral roll and covered an age range of 18–90 
years. The roll drawn was stratified by five-year age cohorts 
and by parliamentary electorates. The self-administered 
postal survey was posted to 2024 people throughout New 
Zealand on 24 September 1998. Sample size was 1201 and 
the response rate was 65.3%. Special attempts were made 
to increase the response rate from low household income 
areas. 
7 Excluding the proportions given under the table who returned 
the No answer and Don’t know options.
8 It is possible to test this hypothesis using the underlying unit 
record data but this has not been attempted here.
9 This positive relationship has been well documented for US 
males, 1947–73 by Beach, who noted a ‘definite pattern of 
cyclical sensitivity that is particularly strong at the bottom 
end of the income distribution’ (Beach, 1977, p.64). Using 
a similar series for almost the same years, Blinder and 
Esaki estimated that ‘each one percentage point rise in 
the unemployment rate takes about 0.26%–0.30% of the 
national income away from the lowest 40% of the income 
distribution and gives it to the richest 20%’ (Blinder and 
Esaki, 1978, p.607). The incidence of unemployment 
is therefore quite regressive. I am unaware of similar 
calculations having been undertaken in New Zealand, but 
they are clearly relevant to the current inequality debate.
10 The only other published reference to the results of the 2004 
World Values Survey I am aware of (Carroll et al., 2011) 
reaches the same conclusion on the basis of the first of 
the two WVS surveys noted above. Their analysis showed 
‘slightly more leaning towards individual responsibility than 
collective responsibility’ (p.8) and how a minority were in 
favour of government redistributing in favour of the less 
well-off. They go on to observe how ‘a clear majority of 
those surveyed prefer to blame the poor for their position 
and believe they [the poor] can get out of poverty if they try, 
rather than blaming underlying structural inequalities’ (ibid). 
The survey results showed ‘no clear mandate to actively 
decrease inequalities through redistributing income’ (ibid). 
11 Similar results apply to concerns over job security which is 
of course intimately related to expected income (Morrison, 
2014).
12 However, on the basis of these same data Louise Humpage 
has suggested that, despite the significant number of neutral 
answers, there was a significant shift away from supporting 
greater redistribution, even during the 1990s when there was 
high unemployment and much media coverage of poverty 
and inequality (Humpage, 2011). Although the Ministry of 
Social Development indicated in 2008 that actual income 
inequality increased rapidly during the 12-year period 
covered in her Table 3, the number of people agreeing that 
New Zealand was an unequal society decreased slightly, from 
68% in 1984 to 60% in 1999. She notes that it is difficult 
to ascertain whether this was the result of slightly different 
questions being asked, a growing tolerance of inequality 
influenced by neo-liberal rhetoric focused on self-reliance and 
welfare dependency, or whether the public genuinely believed 
equality had improved as the economy regained its strength. 
But the fact that almost a third of ISSP (2000) respondents 
in 1999 (30%) also believed that large differences in income 
were necessary for New Zealand’s prosperity suggests that 
neo-liberal discourses did have some impact.
13 Although we confine the international comparison to 19 of 
the 33 countries analysed in 2006, both the distributions 
and the relative position of the New Zealand responses 
remain very similar when all the available countries are 
considered. The same is true of the difference between the 
19- and 26-country comparisons in 1996.
14 Letting pi be the probability a randomly selected New 
Zealander will select category i (Strongly agree through 
Strongly disagree), the entropy is the sum of pi.log(1/pi) 
over the response categories i=1,…,5 (Theil, 1972, p.6). 
The maximum over five categories is log(n=5) = 0.699. 
New Zealand’s entropy of 0.559 in 1996 was nearly 
80% of the possible maximum uncertainty, second only 
to the US (82.4%). (The country with the lowest level of 
uncertainty – the greatest certainty – among the 19 countries 
was Slovenia, whose entropy of 0.387 was only 0.553 of 
the maximum.) The entropy calculations are available on 
request.
15 Such views are well articulated in Hazeldine’s Taking New 
Zealand Seriously: the economics of decency, for example 
(Hazeldine, 1998).
16 At the same time, it is important to recognise the possible 
ambiguity which can lie behind responses to surveys. Louise 
Humpage notes, for example, how difficult it is ‘to tease 
apart if and when the answers respondents offered to survey 
questions reflected their values and beliefs, their particular 
experiences of the neo-liberal reform, or their susceptibility 
to the political debates and discourses articulated by the 
political élite via the mass media’ (Humpage, 2011, p.11).
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